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Dmitry Bam*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson’s outstanding article, Judicial
Impartiality in A Partisan Era,1 is timely given the increasing
politicization of the judiciary. The political debate and controversy
around the Judge Garland nomination and the Justice Kavanaugh
confirmation to the United States Supreme Court, only served to reaffirm
that the judiciary is not immune from the growing political polarization
in America. And it is not just senate judicial confirmation battles that
have become highly bitter and partisan. Scholars writing about the
substantive work of the Court have argued that it is more akin to a
political body than a judicial one,2 and others have called for
constitutional issues to be taken away from the Court.3 The recent spate
of 5–4 decisions upholding President Trump’s immigration policies will
further convince many people that Supreme Court justices are nothing
more than politicians in robes.4
To the extent that partisan bias is a problem, I agree with Professor
Robertson that recusal is not the solution. Allowing potentially partisan
judges to make their own recusal decisions will not instill public
confidence in judicial nonpartisanship.5 I also agree with her that
structural changes, including giving laypeople a greater role in the
judicial process by restoring the power of the jury, are critical to
rehabilitating confidence in judicial independence and impartiality.6
But in this short response I will highlight three important distinctions
that Professor Robertson’s article elides, or at least blurs. All three
distinctions challenge some of the suggestions in Professor Robertson’s
* Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Maine School of
Law.
1. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in A Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV.
739 (2018).
2. See generally ERIC SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012) (discussing the growing politicization of the
Supreme Court).
3. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999) (arguing that reduced judicial supremacy will be beneficial for protecting our liberties);
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004) (discussing the history of judicial review and arguing for reduced judicial
supremacy).
4. See, e.g., Neilsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2019); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2402 (2018).
5. See Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 633 (2015).
6. For a similar argument exploring the demise of the civil jury in recent decades see
Dmitry Bam, Restoring the Civil Jury in a World Without Trials, 94 NEB. L. REV. 862, 863 (2016).
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piece, and all three are highly underexplored in the legal academic
scholarship.
I. PARTISAN BIAS VS. JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
Perhaps the most important distinction that Professor Robertson
recognizes, but does not explore in any great detail, is the one between
improper partisan bias and entirely appropriate judicial philosophy.7 One
basic premise underlying her piece is that public skepticism about judicial
impartiality in politically charged cases creates difficulties in figuring out
when judges should recuse themselves for bias. But this raises a more
basic question: is political bias the type of bias that warrants recusal?
Does partisan (or ideological) bias implicate impartiality in the same way
that, say, financial or personal bias does? Professor Robertson suggests
that the two can have the same effect on impartiality, comparing political
bias to bias in favor of the judge’s own social circle.8
Underpinning Professor Robertson’s article is an assumption of an
irreconcilable tension between impartiality and partisanship.9 In passing,
Professor Robertson acknowledges that “political bias is especially hard
to pin down” because “politics, ideologies, and theories of governance
and interpretation shade into one another.”10 Each one of those concepts
requires exploration and a clear definition. As evidence of partisan bias,
Professor Robertson points out that Republican appointees are less likely
to reverse a capital verdict than their Democrat-appointed colleagues.11
Of course, there is little doubt these days that partisan affiliations
influence how judges decide cases.12 Nobody can deny that the identity
of the judge is often the most important predictor of how the case will be
resolved. But is that evidence of partisan bias? Or is it simply evidence
that judicial philosophy and partisan ideology are inextricably linked,
perhaps closely correlated, but not one and the same. The article raises
but does not answer that question.
Supporting her assertion, Professor Robertson explains that
“[r]egardless of whether the judges were elected or appointed, their
rulings ‘appear to behave roughly the same in terms of partisan favoritism
7. Robertson, supra note 1, at 764.
8. Id. at 761.
9. Id. at 756–57 (describing conflicting public expectations of impartiality and the “hope
for the judiciary . . .[to] move forward [the public’s] desired policies”); id. at 758 (“Although
people generally see judges as impartial, they also want judges on the bench who share their
political views.”).
10. Id. at 763 (citing Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to
Charles Geyh, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 950 (2006)).
11. Id.
12. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore:
Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2016); Cite attitudinal
theory.
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that would cater to their party audience.’”13 But this, too, does not prove
improper bias. A judge elected on an originalist platform, who then goes
on to decide cases in a way that lines up with conservative political views,
may be doing so because of a legitimate legal analysis rather than
improper partisan bias.14 The difficulty, however, is that one person’s
political bias is another person’s (entirely proper) judicial philosophy.15
Although “[a]dhering to a particular judicial philosophy tends to correlate
with a particular ideology,” we generally think of them as separate
(though interconnected) notions.16
The Supreme Court explored the various definition of impartiality in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.17 Striking down Minnesota’s
attempt to regulate the speech of judicial candidates running for judicial
office, the Supreme Court explained that impartiality can be implicated
in a few different ways.18 Most importantly, impartiality can refer to “the
lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding.”19 Partisan bias
can, of course, take this shape. For example, a judge may rule in favor of
a litigant because of that litigant’s political affiliation. No doubt this kind
of partisan bias is no different than any kind of personal or financial bias
in favor of the litigant. But the examples that Professor Robertson offers
in the introduction to her Article—one involving Judge Scheindlin and
one involving Ohio’s Justice Sharon Kennedy20—do not clearly
implicate this kind of bias. The Justice Kennedy example did not involve
statements in favor of (or against) any particular party. Rather, the
concern was whether she would be viewed as pro- or anti-abortion
because she spoke to a right-to-life group.21 And it is not clear that the
partisan bias that troubles the public takes the form bias in favor or against
a particular party in a legal proceeding.22
13. Robertson, supra note 1, at 763 (quoting Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepard, The
Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411,
1444 (2016)).
14. See Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 29, 30 (2011). Admittedly, studies showing that lame-duck and retiring judges do not
follow a similar pattern, suggests that partisan bias, rather than ideological decision-making, is
the driving force. However, it is hard to find conclusive evidence.
15. See Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist
Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14–15, 18–21 (2005).
16. Francisco J. Benzoni & Christopher S. Dodrill, Does Judicial Philosophy Matter?: A
Case Study, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 295 (2011).
17. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
18. See id. at 775–78, 788.
19. Id. at 775.
20. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 740–44.
21. See id. at 742–43.
22. For example, it is hard to argue that the conservative members of the Supreme Court
are biased in favor of a state in upholding an abortion restriction, while at the same time are biased
against a state in striking down a campaign finance regulation.
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Rather, in some ways, what Professor Robertson seems to mean by
partisan bias is actually more aligned with the Court’s second possible
definition of impartiality—“a lack of preconception in favor of or against
a particular legal view.”23 The Court concluded, however, that ensuring
this kind of impartiality is not a compelling government interest,
explaining that a “judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant
legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component of
equal justice, and with good reason.”24 In short, it is not at all clear that
recusal for political bias is a valid basis for disqualification recognized
by the Courts. And given how we select our judges, with heavy emphasis
on political connections and experience, both state and federal, requiring
recusal for partisan bias may become not only undesirable but
unworkable. When we ask our judges to resolve the most difficult and
bitter political issues facing the nation, from health care to immigration
to national security, what can we expect when those judges get earn their
positions on the bench based on their partisan connections (for federal
judges and some state judges) or based on running for office (for most
state judges).
II. ALL JUDGES ARE CREATED EQUAL
A second distinction that is worth considering is the one between
elected judges and appointed judges. Professor Robertson’s article adopts
the unilocular, “a judge is a judge” approach. And typically, when we talk
about universal judicial values like independence and impartiality, we
expect all judges to abide by them. But should we expect the same
commitment to partisan impartiality from elected judges as we do from
appointed one? Should the method of selection influence how a judge
decides cases?25 For most lawyers, judges, and legal scholars, the answer
is a resounding “no.” In the words of Justice Scalia, “[t]o expect judges
to take account of political consequences . . . is to ask judges to do
precisely what they should not do.”26 But scholars should at least explore
the possibility that “jurisprudential norms should change when the
selection and retention methods change.”27
23. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 777.
24. Id.
25. We know that the selection method does influence judicial decisions. See, e.g., Joanna
M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 174–
76 (2009).
26. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.).
Likewise, during oral argument in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, Justice Breyer asked
rhetorically whether “the fundamental role of the judge” changes based on the selection
methodology in the state. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135
S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (No. 13-1499).
27. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
2047, 2084 (2010).
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When “We the People” chose to appoint our federal judges for life in
the United States Constitution,28 we made the decision to place judicial
independence and impartiality as a primary virtue of the judicial branch.
Likewise, when the states chose to shift their selection methods to judicial
elections, as most states have done, that choice envisioned a somewhat
different judicial role. If a judge must campaign to obtain, or retain,
judicial office, it is arguably less troubling when that judge decides a case
according to political, rather than strictly legal, views. In fact, the desire
to link judicial decision-making to partisan politics is perhaps the sine
qua non of judicial elections. It would be anomalous to demand that
judges run for office like politicians, but then act apolitically once in
office.
Not only may we be more accepting of partisan bias for elected judges,
but the appearance of partisan bias is also arguably less problematic.
After all, while most voters recognize that elected judges may in fact be
biased, those voters continue to support the practice of electing judges.29
This suggests that a “reasonable person” is untroubled by, or at least
tolerant of, political biases in elected judges.
Another distinction worth considering is the one between judges at
different levels of the state or federal judiciary. Perhaps political
impartiality is equally important for all judges. But there are a few
reasons why partisanship is more prevalent, and more unavoidable, for
Supreme Court justices at the state and federal levels. Supreme Court
justices decide the most difficult and most controversial questions that
have divided the lower courts and are often politically laden. Appellate
judges generally engage in more law-making, which is harder to separate
from politics.30 We would therefore expect trial court decisions to be less
ideological than decisions by courts of last resort, including those of the
United States Supreme Court.31 And while this may not be a distinction
that most lay people would consciously acknowledge, it is one worth
considering in any discussion of partisan bias in the judiciary.

28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
29. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO STATE L.J. 43, 52 (2003)
30. Richard Lempert, The Dynamics of Informal Procedure: The Case of a Public Housing
Eviction Board, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 368 n.36 (1989) (“[T]he courts that do the law making
are ordinarily appellate courts rather than trial courts.”); HERBERT JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA
COURTS, LAWYERS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35–37 (4th ed. 1984) (distinguishing between the
law- and policy-making function of appellate courts and the law-enforcement function of trial
courts).
31. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 1457, 1481 n.162 (2003) (citing Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in
American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 236 tbl.3 (1999)).
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III. APPEARANCE OF IMPARTIALITY VS. REALITY OF PARTISANSHIP
There is little question that appearances are important to the judicial
branch. Without the power of the sword or the purse, public confidence
in judicial decisions are critical to the rule of law. But generally, when
we talk about the appearance of impartiality, it is to supplement the reality
of impartiality. If judicial decisions are political or partisan, is the
appearance of impartiality still an important value when it is used to
cover up the reality of partisan bias? I believe we should not defend the
appearance of partisan impartiality to perpetuate the myth of apolitical
judging.
Whether political ideology and partisan biases actually influence
judicial decisions is much too big of a topic to cover in the pages of this
short reply. There is simply a great deal of scholarship exploring the role
of ideology in judicial decisions. Legal realists and “crits”32 have been
exploring this fertile ground for a century. Likewise, political scientists
have long argued that politics drive Supreme Court decisions.33 These
scholars have demonstrated empirically that judges’ political views are
closely correlated with their judicial votes.34 In other words, Republican
judges frequently vote for conservative results, while Democratic judges
more frequently vote for liberal results.35
This data is hard to ignore and “[n]o serious scholar of the judiciary
denies that the decisions of judges, especially at the Supreme Court level,
are at least partially influenced by the judges’ [political] ideology.”36 It is
cliché to observe that we are all legal realists now.37 We know that judges
decide cases influenced by partisan politics. We know that elected judges
decide cases more aligned with political majorities.38 And of course, in
the most controversial cases, the ones where the public pays attention,
politics have the greatest influence.

32. The term “crits” refers to adherents of Critical Legal Studies. See Mark Tushnett,
Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1522 (1991).
33. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (explaining the attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking).
34. See id. at 89.
35. Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision Making,
77 UMKC L. REV. 347, 356 (2008).
36. Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of the
Marksist Model, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES
237, 237 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
37. See Joseph William Singer, Book Review, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465,
467 (1988).
38. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All the Others
That Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267, 271 (2005) (“It would appear indisputable, though
distasteful to many observers, that elected judges do take public opinion into account.”).
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So when Professor Robertson says that “[i]n an increasingly partisan
era . . . there is a growing skepticism of the judiciary’s neutrality on
politically sensitive issues,”39 my first reaction is not that we should try
to address the skepticism, but rather that we should encourage it. If the
skepticism is well-founded, if it is based on an accurate evaluation of the
Supreme Court’s work product, do we want the public to have confidence
that the judiciary is neutral on politically sensitive cases? I do not disagree
with Professor Robertson’s assertion that “[p]ublic faith in the
impartiality of our courts is the bedrock of American democracy and the
rule of law.”40 But to the extent there is, indeed, a “growing skepticism
of the judiciary’s neutrality on politically sensitive issues,”41 perhaps this
is a healthy skepticism in light of all that we know.

39. Robertson, supra note 1, at 740.
40. Id.
41. Id.

